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1Executive summary
DAVID DOLLAR
G lobal value chains (GVCs) break up the production process so different steps can be carried out in dif-ferent countries. Many smart phones and televisions, for example, are designed in the United States or 
Japan. They have sophisticated inputs, such as semiconductors 
and processors, which are produced in the Republic of Korea 
or Chinese Taipei. And they are assembled in China. They are 
then marketed and receive after-sale servicing in Europe and the 
United States. These complex global production arrangements 
have transformed the nature of trade. But their complexity has 
also created difficulties in understanding trade and in formulat-
ing policies that allow firms and governments to capitalize on 
GVCs and to mitigate negative side effects.
Today’s official statistical information systems, designed to 
measure economic activity in a pre-GVC world, have struggled 
to keep pace with these changes. Conventional measures of 
trade, important though they remain, measure the gross value 
of transactions between partners and so are not able to reveal 
how foreign producers, upstream in the value chain, are con-
nected to final consumers at the end of the value chain. For 
example, conventional statistics suggest that the Republic of 
Korea exports a lot to China. In fact, much of this trade con-
sists of components that are ultimately destined for the Euro-
pean and U.S. markets. So it would be more accurate to say for 
these products that Korea exports a lot to advanced consumer 
markets.
The importance of the GVC phenomenon has stimulated 
researchers to develop statistics and analysis based on the 
value added in trade. The GVC phenomenon also demands 
that researchers analyze the discrete tasks or phases in the 
production process. Data are now available on the value added 
traded among major economies during 1995–2014. This first 
Global Value Chain Development Report draws on the expand-
ing research that uses data on the value added in trade. Its main 
objective is to reveal the changing nature of international trade 
that can be seen only by analyzing it in terms of value added and 
value chains.
A natural place to start is with the theoretical foundation of 
GVCs (chapter 1). Why do we care about analyzing GVCs? For 
two main reasons. First, GVCs provide new opportunities for 
developing countries to increase their participation in global 
trade and to diversify their exports. Without GVCs, a develop-
ing country would have to be able to produce a complete prod-
uct in order to expand into a new line of business. Historically, 
developing countries have tended to export unprocessed raw 
materials, suggesting that the jump to producing finished goods 
was difficult. Today, because of the opportunities for integrating 
in specific parts of the value chain, many developing countries 
are exporting primarily manufactured goods. (In the spirit of this 
report, it would be more accurate to say that they export primar-
ily manufacturing value added.) The development of GVCs has 
no doubt contributed to this diversification of exports. Still, only 
a small number of developing economies are deeply involved in 
GVCs, China being the best example. So how can developing 
countries deepen their involvement in GVCs? And how can they 
move up the value chain?
A second reason to analyze valued added in trade and GVCs 
is that data on the gross value of trade can be misleading. This 
report highlights how shifting the analysis to value added radi-
cally changes the picture.
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Characterizing global value chains
To capture the variation in the extent of offshoring and production 
sharing by sector and country, the report develops a GVC index 
system that includes three indexes to characterize the nature of 
GVCs: a production length index for the average number of pro-
duction stages and complexity of the value chain, a participation 
index for the intensity of a country- sector’s engagement in GVCs, 
and a position index for the location of a country- sector pair on 
a GVC — that is, the relative distance of a particular production 
stage to both ends of a GVC (chapter 2). All these indexes are 
built through a system of global input-output tables that under-
pin all trade in value added data and that provide the basis for 
decomposing gross domestic product (GDP) into broad catego-
ries of activity based on forward industrial linkages.
Pure domestic value-added production activities are those 
that are completely produced and consumed within one country, 
such as a haircut. When these goods or services are exported to 
another country, that transaction conforms to the classical idea 
of trade, with production occurring completely in one country 
and consumption in another. República Bolivariana de Vene-
zuela exporting oil to the United States is an example. Value 
added created by production across national borders (embod-
ied in intermediate trade flows) are GVC activities, which can be 
further decomposed into simple and complex cross-border pro-
duction-sharing activities based on the number of border cross-
ings. In simple GVCs value added crosses national borders only 
once during the production process, with no indirect exports 
via third countries or re-exports or re-imports. In complex GVCs 
value added crosses national borders at least twice (Wang and 
others 2017). Using the GVC index system, the report charac-
terizes cross-border production-sharing patterns and GVC activ-
ities for 35 sectors and more than 40 countries over 20 years 
based on the World Input-Output Database (Timmer and others 
2015).
Global value chains were expanding until the 
global financial crisis
It will come as no surprise that, in general, GVC production has 
been increasing during the modern era of globalization. Most 
value added is still domestically produced and consumed, but 
the share of this part of GDP declined markedly until the global 
financial crisis, shrinking from 85% of global value added in 1995 
to less than 80% in 2008 (figure 1). Different types of trade all 
expanded their shares during this period, but the most rapid 
increase was for complex GVCs. The 2008–09 global finan-
cial crisis was naturally a disruption, but trade rebounded fairly 
quickly. What is surprising is the lack of further expansion in the 
shares of either traditional trade or GVC trade since 2011. The 
share of purely domestic value added has increased slightly since 
2008. It is too soon to know for sure, but it may be that the pro-
cess of deeper integration associated with GVCs has stalled or 
even started to reverse. Still, throughout this period, GVC trade 
(simple and complex combined) accounted for 60–67% of global 
trade in value-added terms, reflecting the importance of the 
GVC phenomenon.
Further insight into the changing pattern of value-added 
creation can be gained by looking at the nominal growth of 
value added separately for purely domestic production, tradi-
tional trade, and GVCs between 1995 and 2014 (figure 2). From 
1996 through 2007 value added in complex GVCs grew faster 
than other components of GDP (so its share was rising). This was 
especially pronounced in 2002–08, the heyday of GVC expan-
sion. The acceleration of GVC expansion occurred shortly after 
China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), and China’s 
growing participation in GVCs is probably one factor at work 
here. During 2002–08 not only was the share of GVCs rising, 
but the rate of nominal value-added growth was also very high 
in all parts of value added because of rapid real growth, mod-
erate inflation, and appreciation of most currencies against the 
U.S. dollar. The period 2009–11 then represents the crisis and 
initial rebound. What is striking since 2011, however, is how 
slowing rates of GDP growth appear to have had a dispro-
portionate impact on GVC channels, particularly for complex 
GVCs, which were the key driver of growth in preceding eco-
nomic cycles.
The decomposition also allows for the characterization of dif-
ferent stages along GVCs: at each stage value added is counted 
as the gross output of some industry. This report also draws new 
insights on the changing pattern of GVCs through a new type 
of “smile curve” (chapter 2). The smile curve is best explained 
through an example, as in figure 3. For China’s exports of 
FIGURE 1 Global value chains were expanding, until the 
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electrical and optical equipment in 1995 and again in 2009, the 
data points are represented by circles indicating country-sector 
pairs that contribute in production, with the letters denoting the 
country and the number the industry. The size of the circles rep-
resents the absolute value added gained by joining the value 
chain (in millions of constant U.S. dollars). An estimated curve is 
fitted through these points, and the shape of the curve is that 
of a “U” or a “smile.” The vertical axis plots labor compensa-
tion per hour in the country-sector, indicating high- versus low- 
value- added activities. The horizontal axis plots the total forward 
linkage–based production length between global consumers 
of electrical and optical equipment and a specific participating 
industry in the corresponding GVC.
The logic of the smile shape is as follows. Research and 
design activities for critical components of the electrical and 
optical equipment occur early in the production process (left 
side of the figure). These knowledge activities tend to be high- 
value-added activities in GVCs and tend to be carried out in 
more advanced economies. For example, in the 1995 curve 
Japan and the United States (JPN28 and USA28) are in the 
upper left corner, reflecting the high-value-added contributions 
from these two countries’ financial services sector. The Chinese 
industry that manufactures the good, Chinese electrical and 
optical (CHN14), is at the bottom point of the curve, reflecting 
assembly activity at low wages. The activities closest to the 
consumer are marketing, logistics, and after-product servicing. 
These market knowledge industries are also high value added, 
as shown by the upward-sloping part of the smile curve on the 
right. And they tend to be carried out in advanced economies, 
where the mass consumption products are eventually purchased 
by households.
The comparison of the same country-sector export in 1995 
and 2009 reveals that the smile curve for this product has 
deepened. Compensation in the USA28 industry rose from 
about $25 an hour to $60 an hour, whereas Chinese wages 
remained very low on the smile curve. But the bubble that 
shows the total value added produced by CHN14 expanded 
about 10-fold. China may have held a low position in the value 
chain throughout this period, but it brought a huge number 
of workers from its impoverished countryside to work in the 
related factories.
Figure 3 captures anxieties felt by both rich and poor coun-
tries in contemplating contemporary trade. Rich-country elec-
torates worry that manufacturing is being hollowed out — that 
is, that semiskilled production jobs have moved to developing 
countries or, to the extent that such jobs still remain in advanced 
economies, have suffered downward pressure on wages. Poor 
countries worry that they are trapped in low-value-added activ-
ities and are locked out of the higher value-added activities in 
design, key technological inputs, and marketing.
Within-country distributional impacts
The changes in technology and global trade highlighted by 
the smile curves can also be seen in statistics on factor use and 
income distribution in developed and developing countries. 
Here, this is shown using the information and communication 
technology industry in the United States and China as examples 
(figures 4 and 5).
For the United States the left panel in figure 4 tracks the evo-
lution of factor return shares (left scale) and labor productivity 
(right scale). Labor’s share in returns rose from 60% to more than 
70%, highlighting the important role of human capital in this high-
tech industry. Over 15 years the share of medium- and low-skilled 
workers in the total number of hours worked declined (middle 
panel), while the share of high-skilled workers (college educated 
and above) increased sharply, from about a third to a half of total 
hours worked. The distribution of compensation across skill levels 
(right panel) reveals that proportionally more of the benefit went 
FIGURE 2 Nominal growth rates of different value-added creation activities, 1996–2014
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to high-skilled workers; compensation was flat for low-skilled 
workers and increased only slightly for medium-skilled workers. 
These shifts are consistent with the overall transformation of 
the information and communication technology industry in the 
United States over the period, which went from producing goods 
to primarily designing and providing support services.
Now consider the analogous analysis for China’s information 
and communication technology industry (see figure 5). The first 
thing to notice is that labor productivity growth was phenomenal, 
increasing some six times over 15 years (right scale, left panel). 
During the period, labor’s share dropped from more than 40% to 
about 30%, while capital’s share rose from less than 60% to nearly 
FIGURE 3 The estimated smile curve for China’s exports of electrical and optical equipment deepened between 1995 
and 2009
Compensation per hour ($)
Source: Meng, Ye, and Wei 2017.
Note: See annex 2.2 in chapter 2 for a key to country abbreviations and sector codes.
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70% (left scale). Clearly, capital was able to reap much of the ben-
efit of the productivity gain. It should be emphasized that the 
gain accrued to the capital deployed in China, and that included 
multinational corporations engaged in GVCs. Other research has 
shown that most of the value added in China’s exports has come 
from the domestic private sector, and multinational corporations 
produce a substantial amount as well. Thus, much of the benefit 
from the expansion of Chinese GVCs has gone to private owners 
of capital. But there have also been significant wage increases for 
all workers — albeit starting from a very low base (right panel). The 
big proportional gain went to skilled labor, whose compensation 
nearly doubled (right panel). Compensation for medium-skilled 
workers (with high school degrees) went up about 80%. Even low-
skilled workers saw their pay rise more than 50%. The distribu-
tion of hours worked by different skill classes in China is basically 
a mirror image of that for the United States. The overwhelming 
share of labor input in China’s information and communication 
technology industry over the period was low- and medium- 
skilled, though their shares did decline somewhat, from more 
than 95% of hours to 90% (middle panel of figure 5). High-skilled 
input was very small, about 5% of hours by the end of the period.
These distributional findings shed some light on the grow-
ing protectionist sentiment in some advanced economies — and 
on the fact that globalization remains popular in developing 
FIGURE 4 Efficiency and factor income distribution in the information and communication industry in the United States, 
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FIGURE 5 Efficiency and factor income distribution in the information and communication industry in China, 1995–2009
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countries that are deeply involved in GVCs, such as China, 
Mexico, and Viet Nam. These findings do not permit drawing 
strong causal conclusions, but the analysis is consistent with a 
story in which the benefits from GVC-related trade have been 
distributed highly unevenly. For the United States the big win-
ners appear to be high-skilled workers and multinational cor-
porations. GVCs have enabled them to benefit from enormous 
productivity gains in developing countries such as China. Ordi-
nary workers in the United States have not seen much (if any) 
benefit. In China ordinary workers have benefited. Even at the 
beginning of the period factory wages in China were far ahead 
of rural incomes. And those wages doubled over 15 years. The 
wage gains are a driving factor behind the impressive decline 
of absolute poverty in China. Relatively speaking, however, the 
big benefits in China accrued to the small number of high-skilled 
workers and to the owners of capital, including foreign investors.
Developing country participation in global 
value chains
Witnessing this rise of GVCs, stakeholders in developing coun-
tries typically want to see their country more involved in value 
chains and moving to higher value-added activities within the 
chains over time. GVC research can help identify factors asso-
ciated with integration into GVCs, such as the related issues of 
developing country involvement in GVCs, trade costs, and the 
middle-income trap (chapters 3, 4, and 5).
For the involvement of developing countries in GVCs, geog-
raphy clearly matters. The world seems to have three intercon-
nected production hubs for the extensive trade in parts and 
components (figure 6): one centered on the United States, one 
on Asia (China, Japan, Republic of Korea), and one on Europe 
(especially Germany). Figure 6 shows the important bilateral 
flows of parts and components, with the countries that are most 
deeply involved highlighted in red. China aside, developing 
countries are generally on the periphery and tend to trade with 
the hub that is geographically closest. Many developing regions 
are barely involved at all. Most African countries are far from 
existing hubs. And within developing countries, it is large firms 
that tend to be involved in global production networks. In Latin 
America, for instance, small firms rarely trade outside the region.
Unit labor costs and trade costs
How to explain the differential participation of developing coun-
tries in GVCs? Low wages are often thought to be an important 
factor. But low wages exist across developing countries, yet 
only a few locations are involved in GVCs. Low unit labor costs 
(the ratio of average wages to per capita GDP) turn out to be 
much more important than low wages. Figure 7, which plots unit 
labor costs against wages in 2000 and 2010 for a large number 
of developing countries, show no positive relationship between 
them because labor productivity varies so much across countries. 
Countries with high labor productivity will have higher wages and 
still be low-cost producers. The countries more deeply involved 
in GVCs (identified in orange in figure 7) all stand out as having 
low unit labor costs, but not necessarily low wages. In contrast, in 
each time period there is a circle of countries that have very low 
wages but high unit labor costs. These are mostly African econo-
mies. Other costs in the production process offset any potential 
advantage from low wages.
One of the most important impediments for developing 
countries is trade costs, examined in chapter 4. Today, nontariff 
trade costs (freight, insurance, and other cross-border-related 
fees) tend to be much larger than any remaining import tariffs as 
products travel through production stages. Those trade costs, 
which vary by country and sector, have a monetary dimension 
(for example, transportation, insurance, and other fees) but also a 
more intangible dimension that encompasses information costs, 
nonmonetary barriers (regulation, licensing, and so on), insecure 
contracts, and weak trade governance leading to uncertainty. 
These impediments to trade can be expressed as ad valorem 
tariff equivalents and are generally much higher than tariffs. In 
sectors with complex value chains, such as motor vehicles, com-
puters, and machinery, trade costs are more than four times 
higher than tariffs. In traditional traded goods, such as agricul-
tural products, minerals, and wood, these trade costs tend to be 
less of an impediment.
So while weak transportation links, inefficient customs clear-
ance, bureaucracy, and red tape all tend to impede trade, their 
effects are most pernicious in sectors requiring that parts move 
back and forth across borders. The costs of impediments cas-
cade. Countries with very high trade costs will not be able to 
participate in GVCs, and any exports are likely to be traditional 
goods, often primary products. Developing countries try to 
address this problem by establishing special export process-
ing zones, which have superior logistics and expedited customs 
clearance (as well as through duty drawbacks on any remaining 
import tariffs). The problem with this second-best approach is 
that it limits participation in GVCs to the small number of firms in 
the export processing zones, while other domestic firms, espe-
cially small ones that might become parts suppliers, are left to 
stumble in a world with high transaction costs. A better approach 
is to improve trade facilitation for all firms in the economy.
China provides some interesting lessons. China is known for 
having started its economic reform with four special economic 
zones that fit the model of export processing zones, with favored 
infrastructure and customs clearance. What is less known is that 
within a short time China had expanded these benefits to more 
than 30 cities nationwide. Competition among the cities has 
enabled quite a few of them to emerge as locations with low 
trade costs and deep participation in GVCs. Research into the 
value added of trade has shown that the majority of the domes-
tic value added in China’s exports comes from private domes-
tic firms. Foreign firms are often the processing exporters from 
China, but the successful expansion of value chains to domes-
tic firms within China has resulted in most of the value added 
coming from the domestic private sector.
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Further evidence on the importance of reducing transactions 
costs comes from the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index, 
which captures how well infrastructure and bureaucracy work 
together to move goods through the production process and 
on to consumers. A clear relationship emerges between better 
logistics performance and deeper involvement in GVCs when 
the Logistics Performance Index is plotted against a centrality 
indicator of each country’s role in GVCs (an indicator that ranks 
FIGURE 6 Trade in components shows three interrelated production hubs
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a country or industry’s centrality to GVCs taking into account 
direct and indirect trade flows to and from trading partners in 
the global production network; figure 8). The link is not that tight 
(R2 = 0.29), however, indicating that other factors are at work as 
well. But it is interesting that there are no countries in the low-
er-right quadrant: no countries with poor logistics performance 
are central to GVCs. For countries that want to get more involved 
in GVCs, trade facilitation and infrastructure are obvious places 
to start.
Global value chains and the middle-income trap
One of the most hotly debated issues in development is the 
“middle-income trap” (chapter 5). This is the idea that it is rel-
atively easy to grow from low income to middle income, by imi-
tating successful countries and expanding factors of production 
(labor force growth and investment). But it is harder to move 
from middle income to high income, which in general is based 
more on innovation and creativity than on extensive growth.
FIGURE 7 Developing countries deeply involved in global value chains have low unit labor costs but not low wages, 
2000 and 2010
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It turns out that there is mixed empirical evidence for a 
middle-income trap. Chapter 5 finds substantial upward mobility 
between 2000 and 2015, particularly for middle-income coun-
tries, with 79 of 133 countries that were low or middle income in 
2000 improving their income status and none declining.
While there is only weak evidence for a generalized growth 
slowdown in middle-income countries, there is still the concern 
that in any period some countries are moving ahead rapidly 
while others are stagnating or moving ahead less rapidly. Fur-
thermore, problems of the structural transformation of industries 
are quite specific to middle-income countries, and this more lim-
ited understanding of a middle-income trap is usefully explored 
in the chapter. One clear empirical regularity is that upwardly 
mobile countries have considerably more involvement in GVCs 
than do languishing countries. Care is required in interpreting 
this kind of association, but it is consistent with the notion that 
GVCs have given developing countries new opportunities to par-
ticipate in a global division of labor. For the countries that have 
been able to respond effectively to the opportunities, that has 
in turn led to faster productivity growth and economic advance.
Services and trade restrictiveness
A key perception of international trade that changes when value 
added replaces gross value in the analysis concerns the relative 
role of goods and services (chapter 6). In 1980 the split between 
trade in goods and direct trade in services was 80:20. By 2008 
that ratio had barely changed (left panel of figure 9). Most of the 
goods trade was manufactures, with the remainder being agri-
cultural and mining products. Economists refer to many services 
as “nontradables,” meaning that they cannot be directly traded 
internationally. Haircuts and dry cleaning are common examples. 
Higher end services such as health care and legal advice are also 
hard to directly trade internationally. That is starting to change 
with some remote services trade, but statistically the share is 
very small.
However, analysis of value added shows that the share of 
services in trade nearly doubled between 1980 and 2008 (right 
panel of figure 9). Another way of looking at this statistic is that 
much of the value in manufactured goods comes from inputs 
of services industries. The reasons for these developments are 
variants of the older arguments for why the share of services in 
GDP tends to grow: the splintering or outsourcing of services 
activities from manufacturing firms; the growing importance in 
a GVC world of connecting services like telecommunications 
and transport; the growing services component in sophisticated 
manufacturing goods, such as software in cars; and the increase 
in relative prices of services tasks because manufacturing tasks 
are easier to offshore to lower cost locations.
This tendency for value-added exports of services to be 
greater than the direct export of services is true in all major econ-
omies, though the share varies considerably. Figure 10 ranks 
countries in the services share of value added exported and 
in the services share of gross exports, which is smaller in every 
case. In general, developed countries have services shares in 
FIGURE 8 Relationship between the Logistics Performance Index and a centrality measure of country involvement in 
global value chains
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FIGURE 10 The share of services in exports is higher for developed countries, 2011
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FIGURE 9 The share of services is higher and has increased more sharply in trade in value added than in trade in gross 
terms, 1980, 1995, and 2009
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value-added exports above 50%. About 55% of the value added 
exported from the United States comes from services sectors. 
The shares are even higher for European economies. For the 
Netherlands, well known as an exporter of agricultural products 
and manufactures, services account for nearly 70% of the value 
of its gross exports.
Emerging market economies that are major exporters of man-
ufactured products have somewhat lower but still surprisingly 
high services shares. For example, China, Mexico, and Viet Nam 
have very little direct export of services, but in value added 
terms about 40% of their exports come from services. They can 
expect that share to rise as they develop further and move up 
the value chain.
While the links between manufacturing and services are 
deepening, many developing countries continue to carry out 
dualistic policies between manufacturing and services. Pro-
tection tends to be stronger against imports of services, even 
though more-open policies would help countries develop more- 
competitive and more-productive services sectors, which in turn 
would feed into more- competitive and more-productive manu-
facturing sectors. Figure 11 shows measure of import protection 
in key services sectors for different regions. As the benchmark, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries are very open to imports of financial, tele-
communications, and retailing services and moderately open to 
trade in transportation services. Professional services, such as 
law, medicine, and architecture, on the other hand, remain rel-
atively protected. For many services it is difficult to trade inter-
nationally without investment in establishing a local presence. 
OECD economies are also very open to direct investment in 
services sectors, contributing to their competitive character and 
high-productivity outcomes.
Developing countries have embraced import openness for 
manufactured products, especially machinery and parts that 
enable them to participate in the international division of labor. 
But they continue to protect imports of services (see figure 11). 
Countries in East Asia and Pacific have much higher levels of pro-
tection than OECD countries. Countries in Latin America and 
FIGURE 11 Developing countries maintain high restrictions on services trade
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Source: Borchert, Gootiiz, and Mattoo 2014.
Note: This figure compares the restrictiveness of services trade policy across countries based on the World Bank Services Trade Restrictions Index, which ranges 
from 0 (completely open) to 100 (completely closed).
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Central Asia are modestly more open but still less open than 
OECD countries. Countries in Africa and South Asia, home to 
most of the world’s remaining extreme poor, are generally the 
most closed. For developing countries wishing to participate 
more in GVCs and to move up the value chain, one obvious mea-
sure is to open services to import competition and direct foreign 
investment. Improved access to finance, communications, trans-
port, and other services, through reform in general foreign direct 
investment in particular, enhances manufacturing firms’ produc-
tivity and other aspects of the performance of downstream firms.
Institutions and deep trade agreements
Another way to think about products that have complex value 
chains is that they are contract-intensive goods. That is, they 
often involve many exchanges among different firms, each facing 
some risk of contract nonperformance by others in the chain. 
GVC research shows that, other things equal, countries with 
better institutions such as stronger property rights and rule of 
law participate more in GVCs (chapter 7). Research for this report 
found a similar result within China across a large number of cities. 
Cities with better measures of contract enforcement, faster cus-
toms clearance, and deeper financial systems participated more 
in GVCs.
The idea of improving institutions and lowering trade costs 
across the board through better infrastructure, control of corrup-
tion, reduction of red tape, and zero tariffs on imported inputs 
(including services) is clear. But developing country leaders nat-
urally wonder how to pursue this agenda. It turns out that one 
effective route is through “deep” trade agreements, agreements 
that go beyond simple tariff cutting and involve legal commit-
ments on laws and regulations (chapter 8). The different rounds 
of agreements within the framework of the WTO have involved 
primarily reducing import tariffs, and these have had the most 
effect on trade in manufactures. It has proved more difficult to go 
beyond tariff cutting in the WTO. Although significant progress 
has been made in recent years with the WTO Trade Facilitation 
Agreement, the abolition of agricultural export subsidies, and 
several other agreements, progress has stalled within the WTO 
on new global agreements. Preferential trade agreements — in 
which a group of like-minded countries negotiate agreements 
on policy areas that build on WTO commitments — have prolif-
erated. In practice, the most important areas concern services 
trade, investment, competition policy, and intellectual property 
rights protection.
Between 1958 and 2014, 279 preferential trade agreements 
were notified to the WTO. This report rates the “depth” of each 
agreement based on the number and share of legally enforceable 
provisions. The North American Free-Trade Agreement among 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States is a deep agreement, as 
is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which has been negotiated but 
not yet ratified or implemented among 12 Asia–Pacific econo-
mies. Because deep integration often involves leveling the play-
ing field for investment, intellectual property, and competition 
policy, participation in deep preferential trade agreements turns 
out to be an effective way to expand involvement in GVCs. The 
new areas covered in these agreements facilitate the operations 
of complex production structures that span multiple borders. 
Participating in deep preferential trade agreements increases a 
country’s trade in parts and components, an important measure 
of GVC activity.
While strengthening institutions and reducing trade costs, 
perhaps through deep preferential trade agreements, are effect-
ive routes for developing countries to become more involved in 
GVCs, some sobering research shows that in addition to one’s 
own institutions, the quality of neighboring countries’ institu-
tions matters as well. In contract-intensive sectors (such as those 
with complex value chains), countries with “bad” neighbors have 
fewer exports, even after controlling for the country’s own insti-
tutions. This result implies that deep agreements would be more 
effective if a group of neighboring economies all signed up for 
the same agreement. In the case of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
for example, several countries in the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), such as Singapore and Viet Nam, are 
partners to the agreement, as are several Latin American coun-
tries (such as Chile, Mexico, and Peru). The benefits would be 
greater if all of ASEAN countries and the Pacific countries in Latin 
America signed on. In the wake of the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election, U.S. President Donald Trump pulled the United States 
out of the agreement, but the remaining 11 countries are dis-
cussing whether to proceed without the United States.
For developing countries the agenda of reform needed to 
participate more deeply in GVCs is challenging. Moreover, access 
to finance remains an issue in less advanced economies that are 
prone to market and public governance failures. While joining 
GVCs improves the prospects of attracting private foreign direct 
investment, the poorest countries may still require substantial 
additional financing, if only to improve the public transport and 
telecommunication infrastructure as well as trade facilitation. 
In this respect, the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda provides 
a new global financing framework to mobilize and deliver the 
resources, technology, and partnerships needed to improve 
many of the structural and institutional conditions required for 
fostering export-oriented industrial activities (UN 2016).
Toward more inclusive globalization
This report provides some insight into how GVCs are advancing 
the development process and how they are creating distribu-
tional conflict, especially in advanced countries. The rapid pro-
ductivity growth within GVCs shows that they are an efficient 
form of production. They have enabled developing countries 
in particular to move into new activities and rapidly raise their 
productivity. To be sustainable, however, globalization needs to 
become more inclusive in at least three dimensions.
First, in developing countries deeply involved in GVCs, virtu-
ally the entire population benefits from the expanded trade and 
faster growth, though not all to the same extent. In developed 
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countries, by contrast, the benefits of expanded international 
trade and investment are highly concentrated among the very 
skilled in the workforce and the owners of capital. Both groups 
are already high up in the income distribution, and globalization 
increases their share of the pie.
There is no simple agenda to spread the benefits more 
widely. A protectionist sentiment is arising in developed coun-
tries. Historical evidence suggests that cutting themselves off 
from the global market through import restrictions will almost 
certainly backfire. That is likely to lead to slower global growth 
and poor results all around. Evidence has shown that effective 
responses may include active labor market policies to provide 
training and retraining so that workers have the skills demanded 
in the market, a stronger safety net of minimum income support, 
and support to communities hit hard by changes in production 
arising from trade or technological change. Also important is 
developing more detailed official national data that can inform 
policymakers. Considerable improvements have been made on 
the data front in recent years, notably through trade in value 
added–type measures. But with few exceptions these provide a 
wide-angled view, whereas what is increasingly needed is a more 
granular view, at least a view that zooms in on workers, occupa-
tions, and skills.
Second, while GVCs have enabled many developing coun-
tries to increase their participation in global trade and raise their 
productivity, too many countries and regions are still left out. 
East Asia, in particular, has taken advantage of the opportuni-
ties provided by globalization. But increasingly, the remaining 
extreme poor are concentrated in South Asia and Africa. Coun-
tries in these regions can help themselves through further trade 
and investment liberalization, especially trade facilitation that 
improves infrastructure and import or export processes so that 
goods can move easily around the world. One of the interesting 
trends identified in GVC research is that more and more of the 
value added traded in the world comes from services sectors. 
Opening services sectors to foreign trade and investment is a 
smart strategy for deepening integration. Participating in deep 
trade and investment agreements can advance that agenda, and 
such agreements will be most powerful if they involve several 
neighboring countries.
A third dimension of inclusion concerns small firms and the 
informal sector. Most job creation in the world is in small and 
medium-size firms, so GVC involvement by these firms is crucial 
for maximizing the positive impact from trade. Poor infrastruc-
ture, corruption, and red tape tends to hamstring smaller com-
panies more than larger ones since large firms can often finance 
their own infrastructure and finds ways to operate in corrupt and 
bureaucratic environments. Special export zones can be a way 
for a developing country to begin to participate in GVCs, but 
for the benefits to spread throughout the economy, it is import-
ant that the zones are seen as stepping-stones to economywide 
improvements.
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